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ABSTRACT
Background The effectiveness of tax increases 
relies heavily on the tobacco industry passing on such 
increases to smokers (also referred to as ’pass- through’). 
Previous research has found heterogeneous levels of tax 
pass- through across the market segments of tobacco 
products available to smokers. This study uses retail sales 
data to assess the extent to which recent tax changes 
have been passed on to smokers and whether this varies 
across the price distribution.
Methods We use panel data quantile regression 
analysis on Nielsen commercial data of tobacco price 
and sales in the UK from January 2013 to March 2019 
combined with oficial UK tax rates and inlation to 
calculate the rate of tax pass- through for factory made 
(FM) cigarettes and roll your own (RYO) tobacco.
Results Following increases in the speciic tax payable 
on tobacco, we ind evidence of overshifting across 
the price distribution for both FM and RYO. The rate of 
the overshift in tax increased the more expensive the 
products were. This was consistent for FM and RYO. 
Additionally, our indings suggest that the introduction 
of standardised packaging was not followed by changes 
in how the tobacco industry responded to tax increases.
Conclusions Following the repeated introduction of 
increases in speciic tobacco tax as well as standardised 
packaging, we show that the tobacco industry applies 
techniques to keep the cheapest tobacco cheaper relative 
to the more expensive products when passing on tax 
increases to smokers.
INTRODUCTION
In the UK, the tax structure applied to tobacco prod-
ucts includes three types of tax (excluding heated 
tobacco products). First, a specific tax, this is a fixed 
amount per 1000 factory made (FM) cigarettes or 
per 1000 g of roll your own (RYO) tobacco. These 
lump- sum rates are different between FM and RYO. 
Second, a tobacco ad valorem tax, that is only 
applied to FM cigarettes, which is a proportion of 
the retail price (16.5% of the recommended retail 
price, RRP). This tax rate was set in March 2011 
and has not changed in the time frame of this study. 
The ad valorem tax is only applied to FM cigarettes 
in the UK. Finally, there is a general value- added 
tax (VAT), which is a UK sales tax that is applied to 
most goods and services. Throughout the period of 
analysis, the rate of VAT has remained unchanged 
at 20% value- added on top of the retail price. 
Table 1 shows two examples of RRPs for FM and 
RYO broken down into the various tax elements 
payable on each product as of October 2018.
In May 2017, the UK introduced a minimum 
excise tax (MET) on FM cigarettes. The MET, in 
effect, sets a price floor for the added total of two of 
the components (specific and tobacco ad valorem, 
but not VAT) charged to each product. If the total 
amount of specific and ad valorem tax payable on 
each product falls below the MET, then the tax 
payable is that of the MET rather than the sum of 
the specific and ad valorem tax elements.
A substantial body of evidence has documented 
the effectiveness of tobacco tax increases on 
reducing tobacco prevalence,15 participation69 
and initiation1012 as well as raising government 
revenue. However, the effectiveness of tax increases 
on health- related outcomes relies heavily on the 
tobacco industry (TI) passing on such tax increases 
to smokers, also known as tax pass- through.1315 
Previous work revealed that, between 2000 and 
2015 in the UK, the TI passed on tax increases 
to smokers differently depending on the market 
segment of the product. They did this by absorbing 
tax increases on the cheapest products in the price 
distribution (undershifting), while simultaneously 
increasing the price, above the tax increase, of the 
relatively more expensive products (overshifting) 
in order to try and maximise revenue or maintain 
profits.13 16 Research conducted for the period 
before standardised packaging in the UK found 
that the TI uses a variety of strategies to keep the 
cheapest FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco cheap. 
This includes the use of price- marked packaging, 
smaller pack sizes as well as dropping net revenue 
per pack by 18 pence per pack at the time of a UK 
budget, absorbing the tax increase and accentuating 
the price gap between premium and ultra- low price 
products.13 16
When examining the claims made by the TI that 
tax increases will only increase the demand for 
illicit tobacco, further research in the UK found that 
the TI increased its prices beyond that required by 
tax changes, even when tax changes were larger or 
unexpected, thus increasing revenue for all prod-
ucts except for FM sub value 19 stick.14 On all but 
the cheapest brands, the authors found that these 
proportions were approximately 55% (industry 
price increase) and 45% (tax).17
The UK government additionally introduced stan-
dardised packaging for all FM and RYO tobacco.18 
This required the removal of colourful expression 
of brands as well as the standardisation of other key 
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features of the packaging such as the dark brown colour pack-
aging (Pantone 448C), font, health warnings and imagery and 
pack size (minimum 20- stick for FM and 30 g for RYO). This 
came partially into force on 20 May 2016, in which all newly 
manufactured or imported FM or RYO products had to comply 
with the standardised packaging. To allow for the sale of existing 
stock, full implementation, in which all products had to comply 
with standardised packaging, came into force on 20 May 2017. 
Therefore, the appearance of standardised packs in our period of 
analysis occurs gradually.
Contrary to the initial arguments made by the TI, researchers 
found that there was no long- term lowering of tobacco prices 
following the introduction of standardised packaging and 
MET.15 19 They found that tax changes following the imple-
mentation of these policies were more widely and quickly 
passed on to smokers in the form of higher prices for FM and 
RYO. However, sales volumes of RYO continued to increase 
throughout the study period, perhaps because RYO remains a 
less expensive means of smoking tobacco.
This study aims to use market research sales data at stock 
keeping unit (SKU) level to investigate the extent to which 
tobacco tax changes are passed through to smokers in the UK. 
Our period of study is January 2013 to March 2019, which 
covers a longer period both prestandardised and poststan-
dardised packaging than previous work.15 We adjust for inflation 
over the period, and compute expected counterfactual prices if 
all tax changes had been passed through to smokers exactly. The 
statistical analysis extends previous work by applying panel data 
quantile regression methods to the monthly pricing data in order 
to produce estimates of undershifting or overshifting of the tax 
changes at different price points covering the cheapest to most 
expensive products. We examine the extent of tax pass- through 
over the full period and compare differences prestandardised 
and poststandardised packaging introduction. As of 2020, 14 
countries have implemented standardised packaging and four 
more have passed legislation, so our results are globally relevant.
METHODS
Nielsen Scantrak data
We used monthly UK data from Nielsen Scantrak from January 
2013 to March 2019. Nielsen is a global measurement and data 
analytics company that provides data on the tobacco markets 
worldwide. Scantrak data are collected at the point of sale in 
which an electronic barcode of FM cigarettes or RYO tobacco 
is scanned via electronic point of sale system during a purchase 
at a participating retailer. Nielsen collect sales data from 87% 
of Great Britains supermarkets, 15% of its convenience stores 
(including 83% of supermarket- owned convenience stores, 59% 
of petrol station forecourts, 6% of convenience store chains and 
4% of independent retailers) and 17% of Northern Irish stores 
with grocery sales (Northern Ireland represents 2.8% of the UK 
population). The sampling includes 100% of the big four UK 
supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and Morrisons). For other 
stores, stratified random sampling with replacement is used. 
Nielsen then models this Scantrak data to provide a data set that 
is representative of the UK as a whole using expansion factors 
based on the region, shop type and shop company.20
Nielsen provided the research team with a data set in which 
each row is a specific SKU in a specific month. Nielsen calculates 
the price paid per pack for each SKU as well as the volume of 
sales (number of sticks sold for each SKU). Following on from 
the previous literature,13 2123 we focus on a four- level product 
hierarchy within the TI: brand (eg, John Player), brand family 
(eg, John Player Special), brand variant (eg, John Player Special 
Real Blue), and the lowest available indicator, SKU (eg, John 
Player Special Real Blue King Size x20).
As well as providing identifiers used in the four- level product 
hierarchy, for each SKU, Nielsen provides the number of sticks 
sold per pack for FM and the grams per pack for RYO, whether 
the SKU is price- marked or whether the SKU has standardised 
packaging. For sample design reasons, Nielsen recommended 
only analysing SKUs that have a market share greater than 
0.8%. This also follows previous literature that has used similar 
data.1315
FM products were classified as being in either fully branded 
packaging which is the old- style colourful packaging sold 
in a variety of stick sizes, or standardised packaging19 which 
was introduced in the UK between May 2016 and May 2017. 
Branded packaging could further be either price- marked (price 
printed on the packaging) or non- price- marked. The Nielsen 
data do not specify whether RYO was in branded or standardised 
packaging, therefore we classified RYO tobacco as standardised 
packaging if it was 30 g and appeared in the data post the intro-
duction of standardised packaging.
The counterfactual expected price
For every SKU in our analytic sample, we constructed a monthly 
time series of the counterfactual expected price based on the 
baseline actual price at the time point when the product is first 
observed in the Nielsen data, and the expected impact of both 
inflation and tax changes in subsequent months, assuming all tax 
increases had been fully passed through to the smoker. table 2 
summarises all the specific tax changes that have occurred 
between 2013 and 2019. We then compare this to the actual 
observed prices at which that product was sold in subsequent 
months.
One of the key variables of interest in our study is the 
expected price per stick  E[Price]  . This is the price per stick 
in pence for each SKU i assuming that there is full tax pass- 
through at the time of the specific tax change t. In order to 
calculate the expected price per stick, we first calculated the 
net revenue from each pack; this was done by removing all 
tobacco taxes applied to that product at a point in time.
The tax applied to each SKU varies depending on whether 
they are FM cigarettes or RYO tobacco. The tax duty on FM 
cigarettes consists of three elements: a specific component 
Table 1 Breakdown of taxes applied to factory made cigarettes and 
roll your own tobacco
Factory made (FM) 
cigarettes
20 sticks (£)
Roll your own (RYO) 
tobacco
30 g (£)
Price (RRP) 8.50 12.00 14.50 15.19
VAT at standard rate (20%) 1.42 2.00 2.42 2.53
Ad valorem tax (at 16.5%) 1.40 1.98
Specific tax for 1000 
cigarettes/g
228.29 228.29 234.65 234.65
Speciic tax for 20 
cigarettes/30 g
4.57 4.57 7.04 7.04
Total tax 7.39 8.55 9.46 9.57
Tax (% of RRP) 87 71 65 63
Net revenue 1.11 3.45 5.04 5.62
The speciic tax for 1000 cigarettes/g, ad valorem, and VAT rates as of October 
2018.
RRP, recommended retail price; VAT, value- added tax.
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which is an ad quantum tax per 1000 FM cigarettes, an ad 
valorem component which is a percentage of the retail price 
and the UK value- added sales tax VAT. RYO tobacco has only 
two components: a specific tax per 1000 g of RYO tobacco and 
VAT. During our period of analysis, the ad valorem compo-
nent for FM cigarettes and VAT remained unchanged, details 
of the changes in the specific tax and MET are summarised in 
table 2.
Once we calculated the ad valorem tax for FM cigarettes, 
we converted all taxes payable for each SKU into per stick 
and calculated the evolution of expected price per stick for 
all tobacco products. Following existing literature, as well as 
best current estimates, we assumed that RYO tobacco is 0.5 g 
per stick.13 14 16 The initial expected price per stick,  E[Priceit]  
takes the value of the observed price in the first time period 
it appears in the data. To construct the evolution of  E
[
Priceit
]
  
over time, we removed the amount of the specific tax  
(
Dutyit=1
)
 ,  VAT  and  ad valorem taxit=1  for FM cigarettes that would have 
been due at time t=1, this leaves only net revenue, see Equa-
tion 1 .
 
Net Revenueit=1 =
Retail Price per Stickit=1−Specific Duty per Stickit=1
VAT %t=1
−Ad Valorem Tax per Stickit=1
(
B1
)
 
Net revenue is the money the TI retains from its sales once 
all taxes and VAT have been paid. This forms a baseline price, 
which is then inflated to real terms using the Retail Price Index 
 
(
RPIt
)
  as this is used to set the path for most specific tax rates 
in the UK.24 RPI is a measure of inflation published monthly 
by the Office for National Statistics. It measures the change in 
the cost of a representative sample of retail goods and services. 
The UK Treasury uses RPI for various index- linked tax rises. 
This inflated baseline price is then updated over the course of 
the time frame in the data to reflect the incremental change in 
specific tax in each following time period. Similarly, if a prod-
ucts price increases exactly in line with specific tax, VAT and 
inflation, then its expected price is equal to observed price. Our 
estimated equation to get expected price becomes as follows:
 
E[Priceit] = ((Net Revenueit)× RPIt + Specific Duty Stickit)
×(VAT%t) + Ad Valoren Tax per Stickit(B2)  
Panel data quantile regression strategy to estimate tax pass-
through across the price range
Similar to evidence examining tax pass- through in the alcohol 
industry,25 we exploit the panel nature of the price data and adopt 
a quantile regression approach.26 Rather than focusing only on 
the predicted mean of the dependent variable, as in classical 
linear regression, quantile regression focuses on quantiles which 
refer to defined points in the price distribution. For example, 
the 0.50 quantile is the median and 0.05 is the fifth percentile 
(the cheapest) of the distribution. This allows for the flexibility 
for modelling the entire distribution of observed prices as the 
dependent variable. This methodology provides a framework for 
investigating differential tax pass- through for price points across 
the entire price distribution.
The basic version of our model is as follows:
 Observed Priceit = β0 + β1,θExpected Priceit + εit,θ 
Where  Observed Priceit  is the observed price per stick of SKU 
i at time  t in the Nielsen data and  Expected Priceit  is the price 
per stick calculated counterfactual price assuming a full tax pass- 
through. These are both weighted using the volume of sticks sold 
for each SKU supplied by Nielsen.
Following previous literature in the alcohol market,25 we 
consider 11 quantiles (0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 
0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95) which includes the median θ=0.50 to try 
and fully capture the price distribution of tobacco. We run the 
model for FM and RYO separately.
If tax changes are fully passed onto smokers across the price 
distribution then, for all quantiles, the estimated  β1  coefficient of 
a given SKU should equal 1. If  β1  is less than 1, this is an example 
of undershifting, and the producer is losing some revenue and 
bears some of the burden of the tax change. If  β1  is great than 1, 
this represents overshifting and the smoker is paying more than 
the 100% tax pass- through expected price given the tax change, 
and the TI or retailer is gaining additional revenue.
RESULTS
Evolution of prices over time
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in observed price per stick and 
the calculated counter factual expected price per stick for FM 
Table 2 Tobacco- related tax changes during the period of analysis
Tax March 2012 March 2013 March 2014 March 2015 March 2016 March 2017 May 2017
November 
2017
October 
2018
Panel A: Speciic excise tax for each tobacco type over time
  Factory made* 167.41 176.22 184.10 189.49 196.42 207.99 207.99 217.23 228.29
  Minimum excise tax† 268.63 280.15 293.95
  Roll your own‡ 164.11 172.74 180.46 185.74 198.10 209.77 209.77 221.18 234.65
Panel B: Change in speciic excise tax from previous period
  Factory made 8.81 7.88 5.39 6.39 11.57 0.00 9.24 11.06
  Roll your own 8.83 7.72 5.28 12.36 11.67 0.00 11.41 13.47
Panel C: Percentage change in speciic excise tax compared with previous period
  Factory made +5.26 +4.47 +2.93 +3.66 +5.89 0.00 +4.44 +5.09
  Roll your own +5.26 +4.47 +2.93 +6.65 +5.89 0.00 +5.44 +6.09
Panel D: Ad valorem and VAT tax rates over time
  Ad valorem tax§ (%) 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5
  VAT (%) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
*Speciic tax £ per 1000 cigarettes.
†Minimum excise tax introduced for factory made cigarettes: speciic tax plus ad valorem tax (16.5%) of RRP.
‡Speciic tax £ per 1000 g.
§Applied to FM cigarettes only.
FM, factory made; RRP, recommended retail price; VAT, value- added tax.
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and RYO considering the expected impact of both inflation and 
specific tax changes in subsequent months. We weight these 
using the market share of the SKU (% of sticks sold).
In panel A, broadly, FM observed average prices track with 
expected counterfactual prices, though at times the observed was 
above and at other times below. This was more prominent when 
specific tax changes occurred, the observed prices took a few 
months to catch up. With respect to RYO in panel B, observed 
prices are above the expected counterfactual prices slightly more 
often than for FM suggesting that tax pass- through might be 
slightly higher for RYO than FM.
Descriptive statistics on quantiles of price
Table 3 summarises the observed price paid per stick for the 
upper bound of each quantile band (θ) as well as the percentage 
sold in each of the 11 quantile bands for FM cigarettes and RYO 
tobacco. Each θ quantile can be interpreted as the % of SKUs in 
that price band. For example, θ≤0.05 equates to 5% of SKUs 
in our data set are sold below 33 p per stick. Table 3 illustrates 
the difference in price between the cheapest products available 
(θ≤0.05) and the most expensive products (θ>0.95). This also 
signifies the large differences in price between FM cigarettes and 
RYO tobacco, therefore, the quantile bands for FM and RYO are 
on different scales.
The cheapest RYO (assuming 0.5 g of tobacco per stick) is 14.2 
p per stick, while the cheapest FM stick is 32.9 p. There is also 
a large difference in price in the most expensive products avail-
able. The upper bound for FM is 58.6 p, while the most expen-
sive RYO stick is 23.5 p, which is cheaper than the cheapest FM 
cigarettes available. Here we also present the volume of sales for 
each quantile. For both products, the volume of sales increases 
the further up the price distribution.
Estimates of pass-through using panel data quantile analysis
Figure 2 illustrates the tobacco- specific tax pass- through esti-
mates for all FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco (see appendix for 
regression parameters). At the lowest end of the price distribu-
tion (θ≤0.05), our results show that there is undershifting for 
the cheapest FM cigarettes 0.97 (0.95, 0.99). On the other hand, 
at (θ≤0.05), the results suggest very close to 100% tax pass- 
through for RYO.
On average, the median SKU (θ=0.50) of FM cigarettes pass- 
through specific tax changes slightly above the full tax pass- 
through at 1.04 (1.02, 1.06). However, for RYO this is somewhat 
higher at 1.10 (1.07, 1.15), suggesting that the TI passes through 
the change in RYO tax at a higher rate than FM.
For the remaining quantiles, there is evidence to suggest clear 
overshifting of tax on to smokers, that is, prices are going up 
more than the specified tax increase. The interesting narrative 
however is that the overshift is smallest at the lower end of the 
price distribution. At θ=0.25, the rate of tax pass- through is 
1.03 (1.01, 1.04) for FM and 1.10 (1.06, 1.13) for RYO, while 
at the higher end of the price distribution (θ=0.75) this increases 
to 1.05 (1.03, 1.07) and 1.12 (1.08, 1.16) for FM and RYO, 
respectively.
These estimates show that while the TI is increasing the prices 
of their products beyond that of the tax increase, they are still 
trying to keep the cheapest products cheap relative to the more 
premium and more expensive products. This outcome is consis-
tent for both FM and RYO tobacco. As a result, this widens the 
gap between the cheapest and more expensive products as prices 
have increased at a greater rate at the higher end of the price 
distribution.
Standardised packaging
Our period of analysis covers both prestandardised and post-
standardised packaging and the introduction of the MET. In 
figure 3, we split our sample into branded packaging which is 
the old- style, colourful packaging which was sold in a variety of 
stick sizes and the new style standardised packaging. We esti-
mate separately the tax pass- through of the specific tax increases 
prestandardised and poststandardised packaging. We find that 
the rates of tax pass- through for FM and RYO do not vary across 
the introduction of standardised packaging. There is marginally 
lower tax pass- through after standardised packaging compared 
with before, for example, 1.04 (1.02, 1.06) compared with 1.02 
(1.01, 1.05) at θ=0.50 for FM product, however, they are not 
statistically different to each other. This pattern is consistent in 
the two periods.
Figure 1 Evolution of prices over time.
Table 3 Quantiles of price paid per stick and volume of sales
Factory made cigarettes Roll your own tobacco
Price per 
stick (£)*
Market share of 
sticks sold (%)†
Price per 
stick (£)*
Market share of 
sticks sold (%)†
0.95> θ 0.486 9.42 0.215 22.37
0.85 < θ≤0.95 0.466 18.23 0.205 13.05
0.75 < θ≤0.85 0.424 10.70 0.194 9.94
0.65 < θ≤0.75 0.412 16.11 0.186 13.79
0.55 < θ≤0.65 0.407 11.44 0.180 11.58
0.50 < θ≤0.55 0.392 1.65 0.174 7.99
0.45 < θ≤0.50 0.385 2.35 0.171 7.08
0.35 < θ≤0.45 0.377 7.44 0.168 3.75
0.25 < θ≤0.35 0.365 6.77 0.163 3.83
0.15 < θ≤0.25 0.352 6.76 0.159 3.37
0.05 < θ≤0.15 0.341 6.88 0.153 2.96
θ≤0.05 0.329 2.25 0.142 0.31
*Price per stick refers to the upper bound of each quantile band (θ).
†Volume sold is the percentage sold in this category at this price band as a percentage of all 
FM or RYO sold in this category. Price distribution for a speciic product class captures the 
prices of all products falling within the category. Volume sold refers to the % sold in each 
price band, due to rounding, total sales may not sum to 100%.
FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
Figure 2 Tax pass- through for tobacco.
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DISCUSSION
This paper uses quantile regression for panel data to estimate 
the rate of tax pass- through in the market for tobacco. We find 
that the TI predominantly overshifts tax in the form of higher 
than expected prices. Furthermore, we find that the magnitude 
of the overshift is greater at the more expensive end of the price 
distribution, relative to the cheaper products available. This is 
consistent for both FM and RYO.
Research conducted prestandardised packaging in the 
UK found that the TI uses a variety of strategies to keep the 
cheapest FM cigarettes and RYO tobacco cheap.13 14 16 18 We 
find that our results are consistent with the previous literature 
as the rate of the overshift is greater the higher up the price 
distribution.
One of the main arguments the TI made in its opposition to 
the introduction of standardised packaging was that it would 
result in the commoditisation of tobacco and reduce prices. 
Previous evidence showed the introduction of standardised pack-
aging did not lead to a long- term decline in cigarette prices.15 
We also show that the rates of tax pass- through for branded 
versus standardised packaging do not differ significantly since 
the implementation of standardised packaging and have a longer 
follow- up period.
Another strength of our analysis is our use of quantile regres-
sion for panel data to estimate the rate of tax pass- through in 
the market for tobacco. Unlike previous analyses which used a 
price segmentation approach via a commercial literature review, 
we were able to break the market into consistent, exogeneously 
defined, quantiles. That both approaches revealed similar find-
ings provides triangulation.
While we provide new evidence regarding the extent of tax 
pass- through by the TI, our work is not without limitations. Due 
to commercial sensitivity, we are unable to obtain the exact ad 
valorem rate payable or RRP suggested by the TI for each SKU 
in the Nielsen data. Instead, we use similar methods from the 
previous literature1315 as well as conversations with Her Majes-
tys Revenue and Customs to calculate the ad valorem tax for 
each SKU. Following this guidance, we are confident that our 
estimates are close to those paid.
There is some further potential thinking to be done about how 
these findings are related to understanding of price elasticities 
for tobacco. Most of the current estimates on price elasticity 
estimates for tobacco examine average mean changes in sales 
or purchasing and there is little published evidence on differ-
ential price elasticities at different price points across the price 
distribution or across product segments. Our research illustrates 
that the TI passes on tax increases heterogeneously across the 
price distribution; an extension to this can be to examine how 
smokers respond to the price increases they face.
CONCLUSIONS
Our results show that tax increases introduced in the UK lead to 
increases in the price of tobacco paid by smokers across the price 
distribution and therefore support the extensive evidence on the 
effectiveness of duty increases on reducing tobacco consump-
tion and prevalence. However, our results also indicate that the 
TI keeps the cheaper tobacco products cheaper than the more 
premium products by overshifting taxes at a lower rate.
Twitter Colin Angus @VictimOfMaths
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Figure 3 Tax pass- through for tobacco prestandardised and 
poststandardised packaging. FM, factory made; RYO, roll your own.
What this paper adds
 Ź Previous work in the UK has shown that the tobacco industry 
(TI) passed tax duty increases on to smokers at different 
magnitudes depending on the market segment of the 
product.
 Ź The TI did this by absorbing tax increases on the deined 
‘subvalue’ and ‘value’ products, while simultaneously 
increasing the price, above the tax increase, of the relatively 
more ‘premium’ products in order to maximise revenue.
 Ź What is not as clear is how the rate of tax pass- through, 
following speciic tax increases, varies across the price 
distribution of factory made cigarettes and roll your own 
tobacco as tobacco product segmentation overlaps across the 
price distribution.
 Ź We create a counterfactual expected price taking into 
consideration speciic tax increases and inlation in the UK 
and undertake quantile regression of this against market 
research pricing data to estimate tax pass- through of factory 
made cigarettes and roll your own tobacco across the price 
distribution of prices faced by smokers.
 Ź The statistical analysis in this paper extends previous work 
by applying panel data quantile regression methods to 
the monthly pricing data in order to produce estimates of 
undershifting or overshifting of tobacco tax changes at 
various price points across the entire distribution, covering 
the cheapest to most expensive products available to 
smokers.
 Ź Our evidence shows that the TI overshifts tax increases at a 
higher rate for the more expensive products relative to the 
cheapest products at the lower end of the price distribution. 
This is consistent for both factory made and roll your own 
tobacco.
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Appendix 
Box 1: Box 1 which is currently in the submitted draft can be removed and added to the appendix. 
Table S1: Point estimates of panel data quantile regression from Figure 2 
Quantile Factory Made Roll Your Own 
0.05 0.973 
(0.01) 
1.002 
(0.023) 
0.15 1.014 
(0.009) 
1.073 
(0.02) 
0.25 1.031 
(0.008) 
1.096 
(0.019) 
0.35 1.037 
(0.009) 
1.103 
(0.02) 
0.45 1.04 
(0.009) 
1.107 
(0.02) 
0.50 1.042 
(0.009) 
1.107 
(0.02) 
0.55 1.045 
(0.009) 
1.111 
(0.02) 
0.65 1.05 
(0.009) 
1.117 
(0.02) 
0.75 1.053 
(0.009) 
1.117 
(0.021) 
0.85 1.059 
(0.01) 
1.119 
(0.022) 
0.95 1.077 
(0.012) 
1.141 
(0.026) 
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 Figure S1: Main Result estimated using CPIH 
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Figure S2: Method for calculating the ad valorem element for Factory Made Cigarettes  
Is the 20 stick pack the most expensive?
Yes
Calculate Ad Valorem 
Tax using this pack.
(16.5% of the RRP)
Apply this ad valorum 
rate to all other 
packsizes of that brand 
variety.
No
Was there ever a 20 
stick pack?
Yes
Impute the price of the 
20 stick variety which is 
missing. 
Calculate Ad Valorem 
Tax using this pack.
(16.5% of the RRP)
Apply this ad valorum 
rate to all other 
packsizes of that brand 
variety.
No
Calculate the Ad 
Valorem tax using the 
most expensive pack 
Apply this ad valorum 
rate to all other 
packsizes of that brand 
variety.
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